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I. INTRODUCTION 
Initial interest confusion and contributory liability are both well-
established doctrines of trademark law. However, with the growing use 
and influence of the Internet, courts have struggled to apply laws written 
for ordinary “brick-and-mortar” store commerce to commerce in 
cyberspace. Imagine the “Average Joe,” sitting at his computer, ready to 
search the Internet for a specific product. Joe brings up a popular Internet 
search engine and types in the brand name of the product for which he is 
searching. After initiating the search, Joe scrolls though the results to 
find his product. Now imagine that after he has initiated his search, 
several advertisements and pop-up ads appear on his screen. Joe is 
confused as to which one of these advertisements is the one he wants to 
use. But is this “Average Joe” actually confused as to the source of the 
goods advertised by the sellers? Would he be confused as to why the ads 
are appearing or who is sponsoring the ads? Or is this “Average Joe” 
merely diverted and not actually confused? These questions result in a 
split among the circuit courts of appeals that creates significant problems 
for trademark holders. Courts disagree as to whether this “Average Joe” 
has actually been the victim of initial interest confusion and whether the 
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Internet search engine should be liable for contributory trademark 
infringement.1 
The Supreme Court has yet to address these issues. This comment 
suggests that one can find guidance in these difficult areas of trademark 
law by examining how courts have considered the goals of copyright and 
trademark law when making decisions. Copyrights and trademarks are 
two distinct areas of the law meant to protect intellectual property under 
different theories of infringement. Yet copyright and trademark laws 
share one significant goal in common: finding a balance among the 
interests of consumers, competitors and intellectual property holders. 
While trademark and copyright laws protect consumers, competitors, and 
intellectual property holders, often these parties have competing 
interests. As a result, courts have recognized the importance of striking a 
balance among these parties.2 Courts can use this similarity to fill in the 
gaps in trademark law and answer the difficult questions presented by 
initial interest confusion and contributory liability in the Internet context. 
This comment discusses the difficulties courts have faced when 
dealing with initial interest confusion in the Internet context. The Second 
Circuit has concluded that trademark uses hidden from the Internet user 
in coding are not violations of trademark laws.3 The Ninth Circuit has not 
specifically inquired into this issue, but nonetheless has created opposing 
precedent.4 This situation has resulted in different outcomes in the 
district courts over identical factual situations.5 
The purpose of this comment is to resolve the conflict and 
introduce a new, stricter standard for initial interest confusion and 
contributory liability. The new standard reflects how courts have 
balanced the interests of consumers, competitors, and intellectual 
property holders in three important cases involving contributory 
copyright liability in the Internet context.6 The Sony, Napster, and MGM 
Studios cases developed a standard for contributory copyright liability by 
                                                                                                             
 1 See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc., v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005); 
Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).  
 2 See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995); Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
 3 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 400. 
 4 Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d at 1020. 
 5 Compare Rhino Sports, Inc. v. Sport Court, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32970 (D. 
Ariz. May 3, 2007); Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 32450 (D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007); Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 
330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“GEICO I”), with Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, 
Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393 (D.N.Y. 2006). 
 6 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Sony Corp. of Am. 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 U.S 417 (1984); A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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balancing the effects of judicial opinions on the various parties involved.7 
These cases present a strong argument for the way courts should apply 
intellectual property liability in the trademark context. 
The proposed standard for initial interest confusion in the Internet 
context is the “ordinary prudent Internet consumer.” This standard would 
only find consumers “confused” if a consumer’s search for a specific 
trademark resulted in advertisements which actually displayed an 
infringing trademark to the consumer or user. This standard would work 
to benefit the parties affected and balance the interests of consumers, 
competitors, and intellectual property holders. 
The change to the standard for initial interest confusion in the 
Internet context would certainly have an effect on the application of 
contributory trademark liability. The Supreme Court has established two 
tests for contributory trademark liability: (1) a knowledge test and (2) an 
inducement test.8 The new “ordinary prudent Internet consumer” 
standard would affect the application of both tests. However, the effects 
would still work to balance the interests of intellectual property holders, 
consumers, and Internet search engines. 
This comment examines the circuit split created by the “Average 
Joe” scenario and presents a more streamlined standard for initial interest 
confusion and contributory liability in the Internet context based on the 
common copyright and trademark goal of balancing interests. Part II 
presents an overview of trademark law. This section describes the goals 
of trademark law as well as the development of initial interest confusion 
from ordinary store commerce into the Internet context. This section also 
introduces contributory liability in trademark cases. Part III examines the 
circumstances of the circuit split and provides examples of the effects on 
district courts. Part IV presents an overview of copyright law. This 
section discusses the goal of copyright law. It also examines how courts 
have used this goal to develop a test for contributory copyright liability. 
Part V discusses the common balancing goal of trademark and copyright 
law and proposes a standard for initial interest confusion in light of this 
goal. Finally, the comment considers the effects of this new standard for 
initial interest confusion in the Internet context on the application of 
contributory trademark liability. 
II. TRADEMARKS 
Part II of this comment presents a brief overview of trademark laws 
involving initial interest confusion and contributory liability. This section 
                                                                                                             
 7 See cases cited, supra note 6. 
 8 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs. Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853–54 (1982). 
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first examines the major goal of trademark law—that of balancing the 
interests of consumers, competitors, and intellectual property holders. 
Next, the section introduces the Lanham Act and initial interest 
confusion. The comment also discusses the transition of initial interest 
confusion from ordinary store commerce into the Internet context. 
Finally, this section will introduce the doctrine of contributory trademark 
liability. 
A. Goals of Trademark Law 
Trademark laws benefit consumers, competitors and intellectual 
property holders.9 However, the interests of these groups do not always 
coincide.10 As a result, one of the major goals of trademark law is to 
balance these interests to make decisions that maximize the benefits to 
all.11 
Trademark law recognizes that consumers need protection from 
deception and confusion created by confusingly similar marks.12 Such 
protection allows consumers to make informed choices about the 
products which consumers are buying.13 A trademark “quickly and easily 
assures” the consumer that the particular trademark item “is made by the 
same producer as other similarly-marked items that he or she liked (or 
disliked) in the past.”14 Accordingly, courts are concerned with 
protecting consumers from deceit while allowing consumers to easily 
recognize specific products. 
Consumers and competitors also benefit from restrictions on the 
exclusivity of the trademark holder’s rights. The law allows competitors 
to use other trademarks in ways which create only minimal confusion.15 
By permitting competing companies to use trademarks in ways that 
encourage free competition, consumers may benefit from a variety of 
choice and fair prices in the market.16 Competitors are free to “[use] 
                                                                                                             
 9 See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §§ 1:1, 1:2 (4th ed. 2006). 
 10 Id. 
 11 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 1:2. 
 12 Oscar C. Cisneros, Berkeley Technology Law Journal Annual Review of Law and 
Technology: I. Intellectual Property: C. Trademark: 1. Defenses: a) Fair Use: Bally 
Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229, 230 (2000). 
 13 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995). 
 14 Id. 
 15 See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115(b)(4), 1125(c)(4) (2006). 
 16 See Stephanie M. Greene, Sorting out “Fair Use” and “Likelihood of Confusion” 
in Trademark Law, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 43, 43–45, (2006); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“It is 
the policy of the United States . . . to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market 
that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services.”); 1 
MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 1:1 (“[T]he pressures of competitive rivalry tend to keep 
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another’s mark, not as an indicator of the source of the product, which 
would mislead, but only to describe the person’s product, which would 
inform.”17 In fact, “[b]oth the [Federal Trade Commission] and the [Food 
and Drug Administration] encourage product comparisons. The FTC 
believes that consumers gain from comparative advertising, and to make 
the comparison vivid, the Commission ‘encourages the naming of, or 
reference to competitors.’”18 Such uses enhance competition by 
increasing consumer education about alternative products.19 Allowing 
free “[c]ompetition normally drives down prices and leads to greater 
consumer satisfaction.”20 As a result, courts have needed to balance 
trademark protection in light of public policy favoring free competition.21 
While the interests of consumers and competitors are important, 
these must also balance with the interests of intellectual property holders. 
Trademark law grants the intellectual property holder the exclusive right 
to use his trademark to indicate the source of his goods.22 Companies 
today make great investments to establish goodwill and the quality of 
their products.23 Courts recognized this great investment of time and 
capital and have accordingly protected the trademark holder from the 
unjust enrichment of infringers.24 The law rewards producers of desirable 
products by protecting the trademark holder’s goodwill while 
discouraging “those who hope to sell inferior products by capitalizing on 
a consumer’s inability quickly to evaluate the quality of an item offered 
for sale.”25 Therefore, courts must consider the trademark holder’s strong 
interest in protecting the investments made in goodwill and superior 
products. 
Consumers, competitors and trademark holders are able to benefit 
from strong trademark laws. Consumers benefit from access to 
trademarks that provide clarity as to the source of goods. Consumers and 
                                                                                                             
prices down at the lowest level at which a seller can enjoy a reasonable profit and still 
remain viable.”). 
 17 David W. Barnes and Teresa A. Laky, Classic Fair Use of Trademarks: Confusion 
About Defenses, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 833, 840 (2004). 
 18 August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting 16 
C.F.R. § 14.15(b)). 
 19 Barnes, supra note 17, at 840. 
 20 Id. at 849. See also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 1:1. 
 21 Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 22 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
 23 Jonathan L. Schwartz, Making the Consumer Watchdog’s Bark as Strong as Its 
Gripe: Complaint Sites and the Changing Dynamic of the Fair Use Defense, 16 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 59, 86 (2006). 
 24 E.g., Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 n.14 (1982); Nitro 
Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See also 1 
MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 2:30. 
 25 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995). 
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competitors benefit from access to trademarks, which results in free 
competition and fair prices. Trademark holders benefit from the law’s 
protection of the investments in goodwill and restrictions on the 
competition. In order to provide the maximum benefit to all parties, 
courts must balance the interests of consumers, competitors, and 
trademark holders. 
B. Initial Interest Confusion 
Courts have recognized initial interest confusion as a cause of 
action for trademark holders under the Lanham Act.26 Trademarks are 
defined in the Lanham Act as “any word, name, symbol, or device . . . 
[used] in commerce . . . to identify and distinguish . . . [a product] from 
those manufactured or sold by others.”27 The Lanham Act prohibits the 
use of “any reproduction . . . of a registered mark” where “such use is 
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”28 The 
Lanham Act further protects against “confusion resulting when a 
consumer seeks a particular trademark holder’s product and instead is 
lured to those of a competitor by its use of the same or a similar mark.”29 
The result is actual consumer confusion. In certain situations, some fact 
or occurrence dispels the consumer’s confusion before any purchase is 
made. Courts refer to this “brand” of confusion as initial interest 
confusion.30 
The Lanham Act also permits competitors to make certain fair uses 
of trademarks.31 According to the Federal Circuit, “the Lanham does not 
prevent the truthful use of trademarks, even if such use results in the 
enrichment of others.”32 Three types of fair uses are classic, comparative 
and nominative. Classic fair use allows a competitor to use another’s 
trademark to describe the competitor’s own products. For example, “the 
registered owner of the mark SUPERSWEET, used in connection with . . 
. DVDs, might complain if Hershey’s used the words ‘supersweet’ to 
                                                                                                             
 26 See Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2006); Checkpoint 
Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Tech., Inc., 269 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2001); Elvis Presley 
Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books 
USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997); Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 
376 (7th Cir. 1996); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
 27 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
 28 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). 
 29 Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Initial Interest Confusion Under the Lanham 
Trademark Act, 183 A.L.R. Fed. 553 (2006). 
 30 See cases cited, supra note 26. 
 31 Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 32 Id. 
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describe one of its candy bars.”33 The Lanham Act protects Hershey’s 
from infringement because Hershey’s was “using the term [not] as a 
source-indicating mark but only to describe its goods, which it is entitled 
to do.”34 Comparative uses allow competitors to use other trademarks to 
name or describe the trademark holder’s own products.35 For example, 
“[a] competing perfume manufacturer might use the ‘Chanel No. 5’ mark 
to describe the scent of its own perfume.”36 Nominative fair uses allow 
competitors to use other trademarks to describe their own goods and 
services.37 A garage, unrelated to a car manufacturer, may have a sign 
which reads “Volkswagen Repair Shop” to describe its services.38 The 
Supreme Court has held that “fair use can occur along with some degree 
of confusion.”39 In other words, consumer confusion does not necessarily 
negate fair use. However, the Court also indicated that allowing fair uses 
with some degree of confusion does not “foreclose the relevance of the 
extent of any likely consumer confusion in assessing whether a 
defendant’s use is objectively fair.”40 The law protects competitors who 
use other’s trademarks “fairly,” even if there is some risk of confusion. 
Initial interest confusion, while different from actual confusion, can 
still cause significant damage to trademark holders as well as to 
consumers. Generally, confusion results when a competitor uses the 
same or similar mark as the trademark holder to lure the consumer away 
from the product of the trademark holder toward the competitor’s 
product.41 Courts have noted that even if the consumer is aware of the 
fact that the competitor’s product is not what the consumer initially 
sought, this may not eliminate or negate the fact that the competitor has 
infringed.42 Accordingly, courts have acknowledged the initial interest 
confusion doctrine under the Lanham Act.43 Under the doctrine of initial 
interest confusion, the consumer will later realize that the competitor’s 
product was not the original product sought.44 However, the consumer 
                                                                                                             
 33 CRAIG ALLEN NARD, DAVID W. BARNES & MICHAEL J. MADISON, THE LAW OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 263 (2006). 
 34 Id. 
 35 See Barnes, supra note 17, at 867. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 123 
(2004). 
 40 See id. 
 41 BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc. 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
 42 Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Forum Corp. of N. Am. v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 442 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 43 See, e.g., Interstellar, 184 F.3d at 1110; Forum, 903 F.2d at 442 n.2. 
 44 See cases cited, supra note 42. 
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may subsequently choose to purchase the product anyway or stay with 
the competitor.45 The competitor has thus diverted potential customers 
from the true trademark holder by infringing the trademark.46 The 
Seventh Circuit has referred to this method of tricking consumers into 
choosing or settling for a different product as “bait and switch.”47 Initial 
interest confusion focuses entirely on confusion before the sale, and may 
be present even if the consumer made no actual purchase.48 Although 
initial interest confusion is different from actual confusion, the law 
recognizes the damage that such deceitful tactics may cause to trademark 
holders and consumers. 
1. Brick-and-Mortar Store Commerce 
The doctrine of initial interest confusion originated in the context of 
ordinary transactions, often called “brick-and-mortar store commerce.”49 
In Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 
a piano manufacturer who happened to be the former partner of the 
manufacturer of the famous Steinway pianos was selling pianos under 
the name Grotrian-Steinway.50 The Second Circuit held that the 
defendant used the hyphenated name to attract potential customers who 
would associate the name Grotrian-Steinway with the reputation of the 
pianos produced by Steinway.51 The court held that the plaintiff need not 
demonstrate that there was actual confusion at the time of the purchase to 
establish infringement.52 The Second Circuit found that a likelihood of 
initial confusion, which would be damaging to the goodwill of the true 
Steinway manufacturer, was in fact a violation of the Lanham Act.53 
Soon after Grotrian, courts began to apply the initial interest 
confusion doctrine to other situations, but the principles expressed in 
Grotrian remained unchanged. In Elvis Presley Enterprises v. Capece, 
                                                                                                             
 45 See cases cited, supra note 42. 
 46 Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 47 Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc. 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 48 Interstellar, 184 F.3d at 1110; see also Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point 
Software Tech., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 295–96 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Confining actionable 
confusion under the Lanham Act to confusion present at the time of purchase would 
undervalue the importance of a company’s goodwill with its customers,” and, “the initial 
interest confusion does not ultimately result in a purchasing decision, this factor counsels 
against finding the likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act.”). 
 49 BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (discussing Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 
523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
 50 Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1334. 
 51 Id. at 1334. 
 52 Id. at 1342. 
 53 Id. at 1334. 
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testifying witnesses stated that a bar’s apparent association with Elvis 
Presley Enterprises (“EPE”) and the appearance that the bar might be 
selling Elvis Merchandise, drew the witnesses into the bar.54 Once inside, 
the appearance of the bar dispelled the consumers’ confusion; there was 
clearly no association with EPE.55 The Fifth Circuit explained that the 
confusion “ha[d] succeeded because some patrons might stay, despite 
realizing that the bar has no relationship with EPE.”56 The court 
reiterated the findings of the Second Circuit in Grotrian, that the 
confusion created by the competitor’s use of the trademark can give the 
competitor’s product credibility “during the early stages of a transaction 
and can possibly bar the [trademark holder] from consideration by the 
consumer once the confusion is dissipated.”57 As the Second Circuit 
explained in Grotrian, the Fifth Circuit held that the use of the trademark 
to create confusion was damaging to the trademark holder even if the 
confusion ended before a purchase, and was therefore a violation of the 
Lanham Act.58 
2. Bringing a Cause of Action for Initial Interest Confusion 
For all trademark infringement claims, the law limits the 
application of the initial interest confusion doctrine. First, the plaintiff 
must be able to show a valid trademark that is entitled to protection 
under the Lanham Act.59 Second, the plaintiff must establish that the 
defendant used the trademark in commerce.60 Finally, the plaintiff must 
be able to prove that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s trademark 
created a likelihood of confusion.61 The plaintiff must establish all three 
of these elements to bring a successful cause of action for initial interest 
confusion.62 
Plaintiffs must satisfy the requirements of the Lanham Act to 
establish a valid trademark.63 A certificate of registration is prima facie 
                                                                                                             
 54 Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. The Fifth Circuit also noted that here, “initial-interest confusion is even more 
significant because the Defendants’ bar sometimes charges a cover charge for entry, 
which allows the Defendants to benefit from initial-interest confusion before it can be 
dissipated by entry into the bar.” Id. 
 57 Id.; Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1342. 
 58 Elvis, 141 F.3d at 204. 
 59 Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Tech., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 279 (3d 
Cir. 2001). 
 60 See id. 
 61 Id. However, the defendant may claim the affirmative defense that this particular 
use was in fact a “fair use” under the Lanham Act. 
 62 See Checkpoint, 269 F.3d at 279. 
 63 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995). 
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evidence of a valid trademark.64 Without a valid registration, the plaintiff 
must satisfy three requirements to establish a valid trademark.65 First, the 
trademark must be “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof,” which is quite a non-restrictive requirement.66 
Second, the holder must use the trademark in commerce.67 Courts have 
also interpreted this to mean that the trademark holder must be the senior 
user.68 The “senior user” is the first to use the mark, with the right to stop 
the junior user from using “confusingly similar marks in the same 
industry and market or within the senior user’s natural zone of 
expansion.”69 Finally, the trademark must identify and distinguish the 
source of the goods, a requirement that is the most restrictive of the 
three.70 If the plaintiff has a registered trademark or can successfully 
establish the elements of a valid trademark under the Lanham Act, the 
plaintiff must still show use in commerce as well as a likelihood of 
confusion. 
A plaintiff must then demonstrate that the defendant used the 
trademark “‘in connection with’ sale of goods and services.”71 In The 
Trademarks Cases, the Supreme Court held that any power to regulate 
trademarks must fall under Congress’ power to regulate commerce.72 
This placed the burden on the plaintiff to show use in commerce in order 
to warrant application of the Lanham Act: “federal jurisdiction over 
trademarks generally extends only” to uses in commerce.73 Therefore, 
non-commercial uses of trademarks did not trigger claims under the 
Lanham Act.74 
Finally, a plaintiff must establish a likelihood of confusion. Courts 
use an “ordinarily prudent consumer” standard when determining 
whether or not there is a likelihood of confusion.75 This standard, though 
similar in theory to its counterpart in tort litigation (the “reasonably 
                                                                                                             
 64 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2006). 
 65 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166. 
 66 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162. 
 67 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166. 
 68 E.g., Lucent Info. Mgmt. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 186 F.3d 311, 316 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 69 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1047 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 70 See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166. 
 71 Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kramer, 403 F.3d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, No. 
02-633, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 920 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2003). 
 72 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 6:2. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Schwartz, supra note 22, at 94–95. 
 75 Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. 827, 830 (2004). 
234 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 4:223 
prudent person”), is quite different in trademark litigation.76 While the 
tort standard represents more of a hypothetical, idealized person,77 the 
trademark incarnation is more of a proxy for the reactions of real 
consumers.78 Yet at least one author has described the “ordinarily 
prudent consumer” as “very often less than prudent, exhibiting instead 
unthinking and irrational responses to branding messages.”79 
Courts use a variety of factors to determine whether or not the 
“ordinarily prudent consumer” would be confused.80 Each circuit utilizes 
its own set of factors to determine likelihood of confusion.81 Many of the 
factors are consistent among the circuits while some factors are unique to 
certain circuits.82 Compare, for example, the eight-factor Sleekcraft test 
used by the Ninth Circuit: 
(1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) 
similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) 
marketing channels used; (6) types of goods and the degree of 
care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s 
intent in selecting the mark; [and] (8) likelihood of expansion of 
the product lines83 
with the eight-factor Polaroid test used by the Second Circuit: 
(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the degree of 
similarity between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks; (3) the 
proximity of the products or services; (4) the likelihood that 
plaintiff will bridge the gap between its products or services and 
those marketed by the defendant; (5) evidence of actual 
confusion; (6) defendant’s good faith in adopting the mark; (7) 
the quality of defendant’s products or services; and (8) the 
sophistication of the buyers. 84 
                                                                                                             
 76 Id. at 834. 
 77 PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 32 (W. Page Keaton et al. eds., 5th 
ed. 1984). 
 78 Austin, supra note 75, at 834. 
 79 Id. at 832. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See, e.g., Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006); 
Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 1998); Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 256 (2d Cir. 1987); see also 3 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 9, at § 23:19 n.2 (“Each circuit has created its own list of factors and the 
litigator is well-advised not to rely upon a list from a ‘foreign’ circuit.”). 
 82 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 23:19. For a comparison of confusion factors 
from every circuit, see NARD, supra note 33, at 166. 
 83 Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404–05 (9 
Cir. 1997) (citing AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 84 Austin, supra note 75, at 872. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elects. Corp., 287 
F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961). 
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While the lists from the Ninth and the Second Circuits differ, they 
are non-exclusive; courts may take into consideration all relevant 
factors.85 Circuit courts apply similar factors to cases involving goods 
and services competing in the same or overlapping markets (competitive) 
and goods and services in different markets (non-competitive).86 Each 
factor’s weight is a fact-specific inquiry determined on a case-by-case 
basis.87 Accordingly, courts may not require a majority of the factors to 
weigh in one direction or another to determine a likelihood of 
confusion.88 
McCarthy suggests that plaintiffs may use at least three types of 
evidence to prove a likelihood of confusion: surveys, evidence of actual 
confusion, or “argument[s] based on a clear inference arising from a 
comparison of the conflicting marks and the context of their use.”89 
Evidence suggests that at least half of the time, plaintiffs and defendants 
use surveys to establish whether or not there was a likelihood of 
confusion.90 However, courts are free to decide whether surveys should 
receive more or less weight.91 According to one scholar, the majority of 
cases are decided not on survey evidence but on “judicial speculations 
and assumptions about what consumers believe.”92 However, at least in 
theory, each circuit considers its list of factors to determine whether the 
“ordinary prudent consumer” is confused under the facts of each case. 
However, the actual factors vary from circuit to circuit and the number of 
factors which the plaintiff must establish in his favor remains 
unspecified. 
The Lanham Act protects the holders of valid trademark holders 
from initial interest confusion. This protection exists even if the 
competitor’s situation later dispels the confusion, because courts have 
found that even without a purchase, the competitor’s actions may have 
caused significant damage to the trademark holder. To maintain a 
successful claim of initial interest confusion, a plaintiff must establish a 
                                                                                                             
 85 Elvis, 141 F.3d at 194 (citations omitted).   
 86 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 23:19. Non-competitive goods and services exist 
in distinct markets whereas competitive goods and services exist in overlapping markets. 
See AMF, Inc., 599 F.2d at 348. 
 87 Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Tech., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 280 (3d 
Cir. 2001). 
 88 Austin, supra note 75, at 832. 
 89 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 23:2.50. 
 90 Austin, supra note 75, at 834. 
 91 Id.  
 92 Id. See also Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The New Wild West: Measuring and Proving 
Fame and Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 63 ALB. L. REV. 201, 237 
n.270 (1999) (discussing how the level of survey evidence required for confusion varies 
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valid trademark used in commerce by the defendant which caused initial 
consumer confusion. Finally, plaintiffs must establish confusion by 
satisfying an unspecified number of factors, which may differ from 
circuit to circuit. 
C. Trademarks and Contributory Liability 
Under the doctrine of contributory liability, liability for trademark 
infringement can extend to parties other than the direct infringer.93 
Although the Lanham Act makes no mention of contributory liability, the 
Supreme Court confirmed this theory of liability in Inwood Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.94 In that case, the Court explained that 
liability for infringement in trademark cases could “extend beyond those 
who actually mislabel goods with the mark of another.”95 According to 
the Supreme Court, participants in the “chain of distribution” may be 
liable for the infringing activities of others.96 
In certain situations, contributory liability makes it easier for the 
copyright or trademark holder to obtain relief after infringement.97 
Contributory liability can implicate a deep pocket defendant or simply 
reduce the amount of litigation necessary to protect the holder of the 
intellectual property. Framed differently, contributory liability saves 
money.98 Finding contributory liability in some cases, especially those 
involving the Internet, makes it easier to curtail widespread 
infringement.99 If courts are unwilling to protect the trademark holders 
by not allowing contributory liability in certain cases, “the value of 
trademarks to the consumer [and the trademark holder] is reduced.”100 
In Inwood, the Supreme Court introduced two legal tests for 
contributory trademark liability: a knowledge test and an inducement 
test.101 Both tests require an underlying infringement and a material 
contribution to that infringement. 102 Under the knowledge test, a party 
which “continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has 
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement . . . is 
                                                                                                             
 93 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 25:17. 
 94 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
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 97 Brian D. Kaiser, Note, Contributory Trademark Infringement by Internet Service 
Providers: An Argument for Limitation, 7 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 4 (2002). 
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 99 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 100 Kaiser, supra note 97, at 4. 
 101 See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982); Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S 417, 439 (1984). 
 102 See cases cited, supra note 101. 
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contributorially responsible for any harm done as a result of the 
deceit.”103 Many courts have interpreted this to mean that “the ordinary 
business person cannot claim innocence if the facts are such that any 
reasonable person in such a position should have known that it was 
actively participating in an operation which constituted . . . trademark 
infringement.”104 Under the inducement rule, if one party intentionally 
“induces another to infringe a trademark . . .” that party may be 
“contributorially responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.” 
Therefore, under the two tests set forth in Inwood Labs, contributory 
liability for trademark infringement requires an underlying direct 
infringement, a material contribution to that infringement, and either 
knowledge of that underlying infringement or intent to induce that 
infringement.105 
Parties that contribute to trademark infringement may be liable 
under the theory of contributory liability. Contributory liability is an 
important doctrine because it enables trademark holders to curtail 
widespread infringement and reduces the amount of litigation and money 
necessary to protect the interests of both trademark holders and 
consumers. Though the Lanham Act does not explicitly mention of 
contributory liability, the Supreme Court recognized this doctrine in 
Inwood, creating the knowledge test and the inducement test. 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Part III of this comment introduces three key cases that deal with 
initial interest confusion and contributory liability in the Internet context. 
This section discusses the fundamental split between the Second and 
Ninth Circuits regarding an approach to new uses of trademarks in 
keywords and metatags. This section also reviews how district courts 
responded to this division. 
A. Introduction 
There is a clear divide between the circuit courts of appeals 
concerning the application of the initial interest confusion doctrine. 
Congress passed the Lanham Act long before any computer use was 
widespread. As a result, courts increasingly struggle to apply current 
trademark laws meant for ordinary commercial transactions to a new 
electronic medium—the Internet.106 Courts face new vocabulary, new 
                                                                                                             
 103 Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854. 
 104 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 25:19. 
 105 See Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854. 
 106 Chad J. Doellenger, Trademarks, Metatags, and Initial Interest Confusion: A Look 
to the Past to Reconceptualize the Future, 41 IDEA 173 (2001). According to Mr. 
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types of competition, and new applications of old laws. As stated before, 
initial interest confusion requires use in commerce of a valid trademark 
which creates initial confusion. The circuits split on the way to treat 
technological advances which prevent consumers from observing how 
competitors are using other trademarks. The Second Circuit has held that 
use of trademarks in metatags and keywords is not “use in commerce” 
under the Lanham Act.107 The Ninth Circuit’s Internet cases dealing with 
initial interest confusion suggest that such uses are, in fact, “use in 
commerce.”108 This division leaves district courts struggling to justify 
disparate decisions for cases that share similar facts. 
B. The Second Circuit 
In the 1-800 Contacts case, the Second Circuit focused on the “use” 
issue and made no confusion inquiry after 1-800 Contacts sued WhenU 
for infringing on 1-800 Contact’s trademarks in violation of the Lanham 
Act.109 The defendant, WhenU, employed software to monitor computer 
user activities to trigger pop-up ads on the computer user’s desktop when 
the user accessed the 1-800 Contacts’ website.110 WhenU’s software 
selected pop-up ads at random based on categorical associations with the 
websites the computer user visited.111 For instance, the Second Circuit 
provided the example that a visit to www.1-800Contacts.com might 
trigger the category of ‘eye care.’112 WhenU’s software would then send 
the computer user a pop-up advertisement from one of the sponsors listed 
under “eye care.”113 The Second Circuit held that causing “separate, 
branded pop-up ads to appear on a [computer] user’s computer screen 
either above, below, or along the bottom edge of the 1-800 Contacts 
website window” was not considered a “use” under the Lanham Act.114 
The Second Circuit indicated five significant reasons why it did not 
find use. First, the court explained that WhenU never actually displayed 
the trademarks programmed into WhenU’s software to the computer 
user.115 Second, the court found that the “mark” used by WhenU was 
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 107 1-800 Contacts, Inc., v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 412 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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different than 1-800 Contacts’ trademark because WhenU transformed 1-
800 Contacts’ mark into “a word combination that functions more or less 
like a public key to 1-800 Contacts’ website.”116 In other words, WhenU 
was simply using 1-800 Contacts’ website designation as a location on 
the Internet rather than a trademark.117 Third, the court held that there 
was no sale,118 since WhenU did not sell keyword trademarks to 
advertisers.119 Fourth, the pop-up ads did not display 1-800 Contacts’ 
trademarks.120 Finally, WhenU did “not link trademarks to any particular 
competitor’s ads, and a customer cannot pay to have its pop-up ad appear 
on any specific website or in connection with any particular 
trademark.”121 For these five reasons, the Second Circuit never 
considered issues beyond the “use in commerce” requirement. 
C. The Ninth Circuit 
In the Ninth Circuit’s first application of the initial interest 
confusion doctrine in the Internet context, the court concluded that using 
trademarks in metatags did in fact create initial confusion, and that such 
confusion was “exactly what the trademark laws are designed to 
prevent.”122 In Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast 
Entertainment Corp., Brookfield created software that allowed users to 
search for movie information.123 West Coast subsequently began 
operating the site “moviebuff.com” with a searchable database of movie 
information.124 The court explained that consumers searching the Internet 
looking for Brookfield’s “Moviebuff” software would find both 
Brookfield’s and West Coast’s websites listed on an Internet search 
engine’s results page.125 Consumers who then chose West Coast’s listing 
would find another movie database “similar enough to ‘Moviebuff’ such 
that a sizable number of consumers who were originally looking for 
Brookfield’s product will simply decide to utilize West Coast’s offerings 
instead.”126 The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case using the Sleekcraft 
factors and explained that, “[a]lthough there is no source confusion in the 
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sense that consumers know they are patronizing West Coast rather than 
Brookfield [because of the different Internet domain names], there is 
nevertheless initial interest confusion.”127 The Ninth Circuit indicated 
that West Coast’s use of the name “Moviebuff” on its website and 
metatags was “like posting a sign with another’s trademark in front of 
one’s store.” 128 
Later, in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications 
Corp., the Ninth Circuit found initial interest confusion, but never 
specifically addressed the “use in commerce” inquiry.129 The Ninth 
Circuit found “clear evidence” of Netscape’s “use in commerce” of 
Playboy’s trademark with no significant inquiry.130 Both the majority and 
concurring opinions assumed “use in commerce” and focused on the 
likelihood of confusion analysis.131 The court reviewed the Sleekcraft 
factors and concluded that the uncontradicted survey evidence was 
strong enough to create a genuine issue of material fact as to actual 
confusion, enabling the court to reverse the lower court’s grant of 
summary judgment for Netscape.132 
In Playboy, Netscape used a practice known as “keying.”133 When 
“keying,” advertisers are able to directly link their advertisements to 
specific search terms entered by the consumer.134 According to the court, 
Netscape used “various lists of terms to which they key advertisers’ 
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banner ads.”135 Playboy sued Netscape over a list of terms relating to 
“sex and adult-oriented entertainment,” including the words “playboy” 
and “playmate,” which Playboy had trademarked.136 The court explained 
that Netscape “require[s] adult-oriented companies to link their ads to 
this set of words. Thus, when a user types in ‘playboy,’ ‘playmate,’ or 
one of the other listed terms, those companies’ banner ads appear on the 
search results page.”137 The categorical associations used by Netscape 
were different than those used by WhenU. Despite this, the consumer 
experience was the same in both 1-800 Contacts and Playboy; 
advertisements for competitors appeared on the user’s screen when the 
user entered the plaintiff’s trademark into an Internet search engine. 
D. The Google Fallout 
As a result of the Ninth Circuit’s failure to discuss “use in 
commerce” in the Playboy decision along with the Second Circuit’s 
holding in 1-800 Contacts, district courts have divided on the issue of 
initial interest confusion and contributory liability in the Internet 
context.138 Specifically, companies suing over Google’s AdWords 
program obtain different ruling from almost identical factual 
situations.139 The following discussion presents examples of the division 
among district courts pertaining to Google’s AdWords program. 
Relying on both the Playboy decision and the district court’s 
decision in the 1-800 Contacts case, the District of Virginia has held that 
Google’s use of trademarks in computer coding was, in fact, “use in 
commerce.”140 The court rejected Google’s argument that Google used 
the trademarks only in computer coding so the marks were not “used” in 
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the Lanham sense. 141 Under Google’s advertising scheme, when a user 
typed in the name GEICO, a list of competitors appeared under 
“sponsored links.”142 Google was essentially “allowing advertisers to bid 
on the trademarks and pay defendants to be linked to the trademarks.”143 
The district court found sufficient evidence to “survive defendant’s 
[m]otion on the narrow issue of whether advertisements that appear when 
a user searches on GEICO’s trademarks and do reference those marks in 
their headings or text violate the Lanham Act.”144 The court emphasized 
that the ruling applied “only to the specific facts of this case, which 
include the unique business model employed by [GEICO] and the 
specific design of defendant’s advertising program and search results 
pages.”145 
In Rhino Sports, Inc. v. Sport Court, Inc., the District Court for the 
District of Arizona stated that “while other courts have ruled that 
keyword use of a trademark does not constitute ‘use’ in commerce under 
the Lanham Act, the Ninth Circuit has not squarely addressed this 
issue.”146 The court had previously enjoined the defendant from using the 
plaintiff’s trademark in Google’s AdWords program.147 The court 
refused to modify the injunction, rejecting the defendant’s argument that 
“a defendant is not engaged in the requisite ‘use’ of a trademark or other 
mark unless the defendant uses the mark to identify the source of its own 
goods or services.”148 The court explained that, “unless the Ninth Circuit 
expressly analyzes and holds that keyword use of a trademark does not 
constitute ‘use in commerce,’ then, regardless of whether or not such use 
is a ‘use in commerce’ under the Lanham Act, there has been no change 
in the Ninth Circuit on this matter.”149 
In Google Inc. v. American Blind and Wallpaper Factory, Inc., the 
District Court for the Northern District of California held that “the sale of 
trademarked terms in the AdWords program is a use in commerce for the 
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purposes of the Lanham Act.”150 The court explained that “[w]hile the 
Second Circuit’s decision in 1-800 Contacts and the subsequent district 
court decisions may cause the Ninth Circuit to consider this issue 
explicitly, the lengthy discussions of likelihood of confusion in 
Brookfield and Playboy would have been unnecessary in the absence of 
actionable trademark use.”151 The court concluded that “Playboy makes 
an implicit finding of trademark use in commerce in the manner at issue 
here.”152 
The District Court for the Northern District of New York followed 
the holding in 1-800 Contacts that Google’s use of trademarks in coding 
for Google’s AdWords program was not, in fact, a “use in commerce.”153 
The court found that the “[d]efendant’s internal use of plaintiff’s 
trademark to trigger sponsored links is not a use of a trademark within 
the meaning of the Lanham Act, either, because there is no allegation 
that defendant places plaintiff’s trademark on any goods, containers, 
displays, or advertisements, or that its internal use is visible to the 
public.”154 Therefore the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims of 
trademark infringement against Google.155 
The division between the holdings of the Second and the Ninth 
Circuits complicates various district courts in their treatment of identical 
situations. The Second Circuit’s clear decision on “use in commerce” 
and the Ninth Circuit’s avoidance of the issue result in opposing district 
courts positions regarding identical factual situations. Thus, the 
predictability of outcome for trademark cases which involve initial 
interest confusion and contributory liability in the Internet context 
remains extremely uncertain. 
IV. COPYRIGHT 
Part IV of this comment presents a brief overview of copyright law 
in the area of contributory liability, both in the ordinary and Internet 
commerce contexts. This section first discusses the goals of copyright 
protection and the Copyright Act of 1976. Next, it introduces 
contributory copyright infringement. Finally, the section reviews three 
significant cases involving contributory infringement—one in the 
ordinary commerce context and two in the Internet context, to then 
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discuss how each of the three cases harnessed the goal of balancing 
competing interests. 
A. Goals of Copyright Law and the Copyright Act of 1976 
The general constitutional goal of copyright laws is to “promote the 
Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”156 The U.S. Constitution gives 
Congress the power to promote this goal “by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”157 In other words, Congress grants to artists and 
inventors a limited monopoly over their expression and in return the 
public is able to benefit from access to the works and ideas contained 
within them. Copyright law requires courts to balance the interests of 
artists and the public in order to promote “science and the useful arts.”158 
This goal was firmly established by the Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.159 In the Sony case, the Supreme 
Court explained that “[t]he immediate effect of our copyright law is to 
secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim 
is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public 
good.”160 Thus, the ultimate goal of copyright law is to balance the 
interests of the public with the interests of authors. 
Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976 in order to balance 
these interests.161 Copyright law protects “original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed.”162 The Copyright Act protects neither ideas nor facts; only 
the expression of those ideas falls under the scope of the legislation.163 
Under section 106, the Copyright Act grants an author an exclusive list 
of rights, including the right to make copies, to perform, and to create 
derivative works.164 The Copyright Act protects these enumerated rights 
against infringement.165 Plaintiffs establish copyright infringement by 
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demonstrating a valid registration and the defendant’s violation of any 
one of the enumerated, exclusive rights of the Copyright Act.166  
Following the Copyright Act’s grant of rights, the statute provides 
several exceptions to the artist’s exclusive rights, including fair use.167 
This combination of granting exclusive rights to artists then subsequently 
excepting them in favor of free public access is an example of how 
Congress balanced the interests of artists and the public. 
B. Contributory Copyright Liability, Generally 
Although the Copyright Act does not explicitly mention 
contributory liability, infringers risk litigation from a theory of direct or 
contributory infringement.168 The Supreme Court has held that although 
the express language of the Copyright Act does not establish liability for 
contributory infringement, this silence does not “preclude the imposition 
of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have not 
themselves engaged in the infringing activity.”169 Accordingly, “one 
who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or 
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held 
liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.”170 
C. Balance and Contributory Liability in the Copyright Context 
As technology continually evolves, courts addressing copyright 
issues have encountered difficulties similar to those courts applying 
trademark law to new developments. Courts must still balance the 
interests of consumers, competitors, and intellectual property holders 
when applying standards for infringement and contributory liability to 
new mediums. These difficulties and the importance of balancing 
interests are exemplified in three very important copyright cases: Sony, 
Napster, and MGM Studios. 
1. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sony is an excellent example of 
how courts interpret copyright laws, specifically contributory liability, 
while balancing the interests of consumers and copyright holders. This 
case dealt with Sony’s “new” Betamax video tape recorders, or VTRs, 
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and the consumer’s ability to use Betamax VTRs to record programs to 
view them at a later time.171 The Court labeled this “problem” as “time-
shifting.”172 Time-shifting allows the consumer to “see programs they 
otherwise would miss because they are not at home, are occupied with 
other tasks, or are viewing a program on another station at the time of a 
broadcast that they desire to watch.”173 The Court focused its discussion 
on the consumer’s use of the VTR, holding that Sony had “no direct 
involvement with any infringing activity.”174 The Court concluded that 
the substantial time-shifting benefits to consumers outweighed the 
concerns of the copyright holders, and denied the plaintiffs an injunction 
against the Sony VTRs.175 
Initially, the Court appeared willing to hold Sony liable for 
contributory infringement if the plaintiffs were able to show that Sony 
sold the VTRs with constructive knowledge that consumers “may use” 
the VTRs to infringe upon copyrighted materials.176 However, 
considering the interests of consumers, Sony itself, and many television 
producers, the Supreme Court held that the mere capability for infringing 
use did not make the sale of VTRs that of contributory infringement.177 
The Court reasoned that if a product was “widely used for legitimate, 
unobjectionable purposes,” or merely capable of substantial non-
infringing uses, the chain of liability was broken.178 According to the 
majority, there was “considerable testimony” given at trial about the 
potential for both infringing and non-infringing uses.179 Despite this, the 
Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s request for an injunction based on 
an argument that infringing uses outweighed non-infringing uses.180 The 
Supreme Court quoted the district court, which explained that, 
“[w]hatever the future percentage of legal versus illegal home-use 
recording might be, an injunction which seeks to deprive the public of 
the very tool or article of commerce capable of some noninfringing use 
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would be an extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprecedented in 
copyright law.”181 
The Supreme Court also discussed the rights of intellectual property 
holders while explaining its decision. The Court referred to the specific 
context of an action for contributory liability against the seller of the 
copying equipment, indicating that “the copyright holder may not prevail 
unless the relief that he seeks affects only his programs, or unless he 
speaks for virtually all copyright holders with an interest in the 
outcome.”182 This scenario was not present in the instant case, where the 
Court acknowledged that many producers of television programs would 
not oppose time-shifting since it increased the size of the audience.183 
The Court held that time-shifting was a non-commercial, private use, but 
that copies made for commercial or profit-making purposes would be 
unfair and in violation of the Copyright Act.184 The Court described 
commercial uses as presumptively unfair exploitations of the “monopoly 
privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright” while explaining 
that “noncommercial uses [however] are a different matter.”185 Returning 
to its balancing task, the Court noted that “prohibition of such 
noncommercial uses would merely inhibit access to ideas without any 
countervailing benefit.”186 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Sony demonstrates the importance 
of balancing the interests of consumers, competitors, and intellectual 
property holders in the context of contributory liability. In that case, the 
Court found that the interests of consumers and some television 
producers outweighed the interests of the plaintiffs.187 VTRs afforded 
consumers the ability to “time-shift,” which the Court considered as a 
benefit to both consumers and producers.188 Consequently, the Court held 
time-shifting as a substantial non-infringing use that severed the chain of 
liability.189 The Court did not ignore the plaintiff’s claims of 
infringement; it acknowledged this issue by indicating that non-
commercial uses are presumptively unfair in violation of the copyright 
statue.190 After balancing the interests of all sides, the Supreme Court 
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denied the plaintiff’s request for an injunction against Sony’s sale of the 
VTRs.191 
2. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. 
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. is another example of how courts 
balance the interests of consumers and intellectual property holders in the 
context of contributory infringement. Decided after Sony, the Ninth 
Circuit in this case found Napster liable for contributory infringement.192 
Napster offered users free software that facilitated “peer-to-peer” file 
sharing.193 Among other things, the software allowed users to: “(1) make 
MP3 music files stored on individual computer hard drives available for 
copying by other Napster users; (2) search for MP3 music files stored on 
other users’ computers; and (3) transfer exact copies of the contents of 
other users’ MP3 files from one computer to another via the Internet.”194 
The court found that Napster, by its conduct, knowingly encouraged and 
assisted in the infringement of A&M’s copyrights and was therefore 
liable for contributory infringement.195 
According to the Ninth Circuit, ordinarily the defendant must make 
a material contribution and “know or have reason to know” of the direct 
infringement to be held liable for contributory infringement.196 Napster’s 
material contribution was simple—providing the “site and facilities” for 
the direct infringers.197 However, according to the Ninth Circuit, in the 
Internet context, courts should construe the knowledge requirement 
much more narrowly.198 The opinion indicated that a court may not 
impute the knowledge required to find contributory liability “merely 
because peer-to-peer file sharing technology may be used to infringe 
plaintiffs’ copyrights.”199 The Ninth Circuit explained that Napster was 
required to prove that it did not have actual knowledge of the 
infringement.200 According to the court, “the copyright holder must 
‘provide the necessary documentation [to Napster] to show there is likely 
infringement.’”201 However, once Napster learned that users were able to 
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access specific infringing materials, Napster had a duty to purge the 
infringing materials from the system.202 Failure to do so, according to the 
court, was evidence that Napster actually knew of the infringement and 
contributed to the direct infringement.203 In other words, the Ninth 
Circuit requires that the system operator, in this case Napster, possess 
specific information pertaining to copyright infringement and not mere 
knowledge of the potential for the software to facilitate infringement.204 
The court concluded that Napster did, in fact, have sufficient knowledge 
of the infringing activities to be liable for contributory infringement.205 
In its decision, the Ninth Circuit balanced the right of consumers to 
use file sharing technology with the rights of intellectual property 
holders. The court refused to enjoin all peer-to-peer file sharing “simply 
because a computer network allows for infringing use.”206 Such a 
decision, according to the court, would “violate Sony and potentially 
restrict activity unrelated to infringing use.”207 The Ninth Circuit then 
remanded the case back to the district court to determine the details of 
the injunction against Napster.208 Napster was later enjoined “from 
engaging in, or facilitating others in, copying, downloading, uploading, 
transmitting, or distributing copyrighted sound recordings,” in 
accordance with the district court’s order.209 This order did not prevent 
Napster from allowing consumers to use its software for non-infringing 
uses.210 
In Napster, the Ninth Circuit found Napster liable for infringement 
while at the same time balancing the interests of consumers and 
intellectual property holders. The Ninth Circuit required more than 
constructive knowledge of the software’s potential for infringing uses.211 
The plaintiffs were able to demonstrate that Napster had made a material 
contribution to the infringing activities of its users and that the company 
had sufficient knowledge of the infringement.212 As a result, the court 
enjoined Napster from facilitating the distribution of copyrighted 
materials.213 However, after balancing the interests of consumers and 
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intellectual property holders, the court also held that the law should not 
restrict all peer-to-peer file sharing.214 Thus, the court concluded that, 
although it was necessary to protect the intellectual property holders, it 
was also important for consumers to be able to use the file sharing 
technology.215 
3. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. is the third example of a court 
balancing the interests of consumers and intellectual property holders in 
the context of contributory copyright infringement.216 In MGM Studios, 
the Supreme Court added another element to the contributory liability 
equation—intent to induce.217 The MGM Studios case involved peer-to-
peer file sharing that was similar to the Napster software. 218 The 
defendants, Grokster and Streamcast, distributed free software that 
enabled users to download copyrighted and non-copyrighted materials 
directly from other users.219 In reversing the Ninth’s Circuit’s grant of 
summary judgment to the defendants, the Supreme Court explained that 
a party which promotes its product and encourages copyright 
infringement, “as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps 
taken to foster infringement,” will be liable for contributory 
infringement.220 
The Court denied the defendants summary judgment because the 
plaintiffs had successfully alleged a material contribution, knowledge of 
the infringement, and intent to induce the users to infringe.221 The Court 
tied all of these factors together to create an “inducement rule.”222 After 
balancing the potential effects of the rule, the Court noted that its 
“inducement rule” would do “nothing to compromise legitimate 
commerce or discourage innovation.”223 Under the “inducement rule,” 
the Court required a showing of “purposeful, culpable expression and 
conduct,” which it found in the instant case.224 The defendants had 
developed promotional materials that touted their products as the best 
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alternative to Napster.225 There was also evidence that Streamcast had 
planned to promote illegal uses of its product.226 The Court found no 
evidence that the defendants had made even the slightest effort to “filter 
copyrighted material from users’ downloads or otherwise impede the 
sharing of copyrighted files.”227 That behavior convinced the Court of the 
defendants’ intent to induce consumers to infringe, and was a sufficient 
basis to deny the defendant summary judgment.228 
The defendants argued that, in light of Sony, the software’s ability 
to sustain non-infringing uses severed the chain of liability.229 Yet the 
Court was unwilling to apply the Sony rule because of the egregious 
conduct by the defendants.230 To the Court, “a showing that infringement 
was encouraged overcomes the law’s reluctance to find liability when a 
defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful 
use.”231 In other words, evidence of intent to induce infringement by a 
third party may be so powerful that it is able to overcome the rule 
developed in Sony. 
The Supreme Court did not decide MGM Studios without balancing 
the effects of its holding. The plaintiffs argued that finding in favor of the 
defendants would upset the “balance between the respective values of 
supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting 
innovation in new communication technologies by limiting the incidence 
of liability for copyright infringement.”232 Citing to Sony, the majority 
acknowledged that the “more artistic protection is favored, the more 
technological innovation may be discouraged; the administration of 
copyright law is an exercise in managing the trade-off.”233 The Court 
concluded that finding in favor of the plaintiffs and reversing summary 
judgment for the defendants was in the best interests of both consumers 
as well as intellectual property holders.  
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In MGM Studios, the Supreme Court utilized the “inducement rule” 
and denied the defendant summary judgment.234 The plaintiffs were able 
to show a material contribution, knowledge of the infringement, and a 
total lack of any action on the defendants’ part to curb infringing 
downloads.235 The defendants were not able to succeed using Sony’s 
substantial non-infringing uses defense because of the their clear intent to 
induce users to download infringing materials.236 Therefore, the Court 
denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and remanded the 
case to consider the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.237 
The three aforementioned copyright cases each demonstrate how 
courts balance the interests of competing parties when applying the 
doctrine of contributory liability in the copyright context. In Sony, the 
consumer’s interest in maintaining the ability to time-shift outweighed 
the imposition of contributory infringement liability on the producers of 
the infringing equipment.238 To satisfy the balance, the Supreme Court 
applied the rule that the manufacturers of equipment used to infringe 
could escape liability if the products were capable of substantial non-
infringing uses.239 In Napster, the Ninth Circuit found that parties who 
provide a material contribution may be liable for the infringement if 
there was actual knowledge of infringing activities by third parties using 
the products.240 Finally, in MGM Studios, the Supreme Court held that a 
showing of intent to encourage infringing activities is sufficient to rebut 
Sony’s substantial non-infringing uses defense.241 In sum, both the 
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit utilized “contributory liability” to 
satisfy the balance between the interests of consumers and intellectual 
property holders. 
V. BALANCING CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY AND INITIAL INTEREST 
CONFUSION 
Part V of this comment discusses initial interest confusion and 
contributory trademark liability in the Internet context. First, this section 
describes the balancing goal of copyright law analogous to trademark 
law. Next, the section discusses how courts should treat initial interest 
confusion in the Internet context with respect to balancing the interests of 
consumers and intellectual property holders. Finally, this section 
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examines the effect of a new standard for initial interest confusion on the 
application of contributory liability in the Internet context. 
A. The Analogous Balance 
Admittedly, the laws of trademark and copyright protection are 
significantly different.242 Trademark laws are founded on principles that 
seek to avoid deception and unfair competition,243 while copyright laws 
derive from the wording of the U.S. Constitution.244 Despite this 
difference, the underlying goals of both trademark and copyright laws 
share many similarities. In these areas of intellectual property law, courts 
have recognized the importance of balancing consumer interests with the 
interests of the intellectual property holders.245 As the three copyright 
cases discussed prior have shown, Sony, Napster, and MGM Studios, 
judges are concerned with balancing competing interests, generally 
reasoning to promote this balance. 
B. Initial Interest Confusion in Light of this Balance 
The underlying goal of trademark law is to balance the interests of 
consumers and intellectual property holders. The circuit split created by 
the Second and Ninth Circuits complicates the balancing task for district 
courts. As a result, this comment suggests a new approach that 
incorporates a broader understanding of “use in commerce” into a 
narrower concept of “confusion” in the Internet context. 
1. “Use in Commerce” 
The “use in commerce” inquiry is very important in trademark 
cases. Without establishing “use,” plaintiffs are unable to invoke 
protection under the Lanham Act.246 Given rapid changes in technology 
and coding on the Internet, one can easily observe that the Second 
Circuit’s decision was too narrow. By restricting the “use in commerce” 
requirement, the Second Circuit ignored the fact that technology is ever-
changing and that more likely than not, in the near future there will be 
new, more subtle ways in which defendants will be attempt to use and 
abuse trademarks on the Internet. The Second Circuit failed to balance 
the effects of its decision between consumers and intellectual property 
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holders. This discrepancy favors a strong argument that, in the Internet 
context, “use” of trademarks in Google’s AdWords program is, in fact, 
“use in commerce,” regardless of how deeply the defendants buried the 
trademark in coding, or whether or not the consumer was able to see the 
plaintiff’s trademarks on the computer screen. 
2. Likelihood of Confusion 
Once the plaintiff has been able to invoke the protection of the 
Lanham Act, the plaintiff must still establish a likelihood of confusion—
“the most difficult of the Lanham Act requirements to prove.”247 The 
Ninth Circuit recognized that many of the Sleekcraft factors did not 
apply in the Internet context.248 In reality, many of the factors are not 
applicable to the Internet context and do not answer whether or not the 
ordinary prudent consumer would be confused.249 
At one time, courts considered the sophistication of the average 
Internet user to be very low. According to the District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, in 1998 “many Internet users [were] not 
sophisticated enough to distinguish between the subtle difference in the 
domain names of the parties.”250 At that time, the Internet was relatively 
new to many computer users, and only available to a limited number of 
consumers. Today, a decade after the initial statement was made, the 
outmoded standard mandates an updated review of consumer interests as 
well as the interests of intellectual property holders. After all, the 
widespread use of computers and the Internet is what prompted the prior 
development in the law through cases such as 1-800 Contacts, Playboy, 
Napster, and MGM Studios. 
The question then becomes, who is the new “ordinary prudent 
Internet consumer”? The Second Circuit described average consumers as 
“the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who, in making 
purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed by appearances and 
general impressions.”251 That average consumer has already been placed 
into the Internet context, and according to the District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, he is not too reasonable.252 In GEICO and 
                                                                                                             
 247 Lauren Troxclair, Note, Search Engines and Internet Advertisers: Just One Click 
Away from Trademark Infringement?, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1365, 1398 (2005). 
 248 See Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 941–42 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 249 See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th 
Cir. 2004); Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1062, 1058 
(9th Cir. 1999). 
 250 Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 303 (D.N.J. 1998). 
 251 Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910). 
 252 See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535 (D. Va. 
2000); Jews, 993 F. Supp. at 303. 
2007] Balancing Trademarks and Copyrights: A Better Way 255 
Playboy, the court’s “confusion” analysis relied on the interpretation of 
consumer surveys produced by both sides.253 But in GEICO, the 
plaintiffs were able to sustain a cause of action for confusion only for 
those advertisements that displayed the plaintiffs’ trademarks to 
consumers.254 Thus, according to the GEICO court, the ordinary prudent 
Internet consumer was only “confused” in the Lanham sense when the 
consumer entered the plaintiff’s trademark into an Internet search engine  
and the competing advertisements on the results page actually displayed 
the plaintiff’s trademarks. 
A new standard would arm courts with an improved ability to 
answer many of the questions presented by the “Average Joe” scenario. 
In such circumstances, the defendant would have clearly “used the good 
will associated with the Plaintiffs’ trademarks in such a way that [the 
ordinary prudent Internet consumer] might be lured to the [products] 
from Plaintiffs’ competitors” to violate the Lanham Act.255 This is 
essentially the “bait and switch” tactic that the Seventh Circuit discussed 
in Dorr-Oliver.256 Presenting advertisements which utilize the trademarks 
of a competitor “effectively [allows] the competitor to get its foot in the 
door by confusing consumers” as to the source of the advertisements.257 
The consumer searches for the trademark, and an advertisement appears. 
The consumer clicks on the advertisement and finds himself on a 
competing website. Google itself recognized the unauthorized use of 
trademarks in advertisements as a problem and it created a complaint 
system for trademark holders in response.258 A more rigid standard for 
                                                                                                             
 253 Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1027. 
 254 GEICO II, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 18642, at *4. 
 255 Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 256 Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid Quip, Inc. 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 257 Id. 
 258 Google, Inc., AdWords Trademark Complaint Procedure,  
http://www.google.com/tm_complaint_adwords.html#1 (last visited Dec. 28, 2007). 
Google’s website discusses its willingness “to perform a limited investigation of 
reasonable complaints,” and explains its procedures as follows: 
When we receive a complaint from a trademark owner, we only investigate 
the use of the trademark in ad text. If the advertiser is using the trademark in 
ad text, we will require the advertiser to remove the trademark and prevent 
them from using it in ad text in the future. Please note that we will not 
disable keywords in response to a trademark complaint. In addition, please 
note that any such investigation will only affect ads served on or by Google 
. . . The following procedure applies only to the use of terms that may be 
trademarks in advertisements, which are clearly marked as sponsored links 
on our results pages. We do not take action on objections to the use of 
trademarks in sites that appear in our search results, i.e., the left-side of a 
results page. For any such objections, please contact the site owner directly. 
Id. 
256 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 4:223 
initial interest confusion in the Internet context clarifies many of the 
questions presented by the “Average Joe” scenario. 
3. The New “Ordinary Prudent Internet Consumer” and Balance 
Restricting the confusion analysis to the “ordinary prudent Internet 
consumer” would satisfy the balance of interests between consumers, 
competitors, and intellectual property holders. Although arguably 
annoying, pop-ups and other advertisements can benefit the consumer.259 
First, search engine advertisements inform consumers about other 
companies on the Internet that offer the same or similar products. 
Second, advertisements expose the consumer to multiple sources of 
similar products. Third, the consumer is quickly able to compare prices 
on products in various physical locations. Finally, consumers can easily 
“click” back to the original website or product they were originally 
searching for: “[t]he risk of losing customers who are initially confused 
is lessened on the Internet as compared, for example, to when a billboard 
employs initial interest confusion to entice a customer down the wrong 
road because a customer can retrace his steps almost instantaneously 
online.”260 It is important to recognize that advertisements, when not 
confusing, do offer some benefit to consumers; thus, courts consider this 
when balancing the effects of precedential decisions. 
The “ordinary prudent Internet consumer” standard would also 
enhance competition by creating a clear standard which does not saddle 
competitors with unfair liability. In general, “competitors have an 
affirmative right to use others’ trademarks to capture public attention and 
attempt to divert it to their own products.”261 As explained in the GEICO 
case, if the defendants had properly labeled their advertisements with the 
defendants’ trademarks, it would likely not result in consumer 
confusion.262 In such a situation, the defendant could argue that the use of 
the plaintiff’s trademark was a fair use.263 However, if defendants have 
used the plaintiff’s trademarks in their advertisements in such a way as to 
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create confusion, the “ordinary prudent Internet consumer” standard 
would hold defendants liable for initial interest confusion. 
Additionally, adopting a high standard for initial interest confusion 
may also benefit the trademark holder. First, free search engines are not 
available only to the consumer. Trademark holders may also take 
advantage of search engines as an opportunity to find out who the 
competition is and what the competition is doing. Second, the fact that 
consumers are able to shop competitively does not damage the trademark 
holder’s goodwill. There must be some type of association between the 
trademark holder and the competing product before a court will 
recognize any damage to the goodwill of the trademark holder.264 
Problems arise only “when the goodwill and reputation of a plaintiff’s 
trademark is linked to products which are of shoddy quality or which 
conjure associations that clash with the associations generated by the 
owner’s lawful use of the mark . . . .”265 If there is no likelihood of 
confusion, there can be no tarnishment. Third, there is cognizable danger 
when courts are allowed to create norms that “prohibit search engines 
from ‘using’ trademarks in any way that might bring financial benefit to 
the trademark holder’s competitor” because then the courts will have 
disserved the information objectives of the Lanham Act by turning 
trademarks into vehicles for suppressing information.”266 Finally, a 
specific inquiry for initial interest confusion would eliminate the need for 
expensive survey data that is uncertain at best. Presumably, if the 
standards and the laws are clear and simple, there will be less 
litigation.267 The outcome of initial interest confusion litigation in the 
Internet context would become more predictable and the parties “would 
be more willing to settle.”268 Accordingly, this new standard would prove 
beneficial to trademark holders. 
The underlying goal of trademark law is to balance the interests of 
consumers, competitors, and intellectual property holders. This balance 
translates into every aspect of the application of trademark law including 
the “use in commerce” and “initial interest confusion” inquiries. A court 
should not minimize the “use in commerce” inquiry; neither should a 
court restrict applications of law due to technological loopholes. The 
District Court for the District of Virginia’s holding that Internet 
                                                                                                             
 264 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied 
and appeal dismissed, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987). 
 265 Id. at 31. 
 266 Symposium, supra note 261, at 784. 
 267 Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: 
Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest for Predictability in the On-
Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 992 n.52 (2000). 
 268 Id. 
258 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 4:223 
advertisements would not create confusion unless the defendants actually 
used the trademark in the competing advertisement is a clear standard for 
the “new” ordinary prudent Internet consumer. Such a standard for the 
“ordinary prudent Internet consumer” answers many of the questions 
discussed in the “Average Joe” scenario to satisfy the balance between 
the interests of the consumer, competitors, and trademark holders. 
C. Contributory Liability in Light of this Balance 
As explained in this comment, courts favor balancing interests in 
both copyright and trademark cases. The new “ordinary prudent Internet 
consumer” standard for initial interest confusion is the result of this 
balancing task. However, the consequences of implementing a new 
confusion standard do not end with direct infringers. The new standard 
would also affect claims of contributory liability. One should consider 
the effects on contributory liability in light of the similarities and 
differences between trademark and copyright laws as well as the balance 
between the interests of Internet search engines and intellectual property 
holders. 
1. Contributory Trademark Liability versus Contributory Copyright 
Liability in the Internet Context 
The standards of contributory liability for trademark and copyright 
law share significant similarities and differences. In Inwood Labs, the 
Supreme Court outlined two tests for contributory liability: (1) one who 
“intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark,” and (2) 
“continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to 
know is engaging in trademark infringement,” can be held liable for 
contributory infringement.269 The elements involved (knowledge, intent, 
and a material contribution) are identical between the trademark and the 
copyright standards. However, in the Internet context, there are very 
important differences. First, the test applied in Napster was much stricter 
than the Inwood Labs test because the Ninth Circuit required actual 
knowledge rather than constructive knowledge: “knows or has reason to 
know.”270 Second, if trademark holders were unable to prove knowledge 
and a material contribution, Inwood Labs introduced a second test by 
asking whether the defendants intentionally induce the infringement.271 
While the copyright test for contributory liability required knowledge, 
plaintiffs only need to show intent to rebut a Sony “substantial non-
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infringing uses” defense. Thus, while the elements of contributory 
liability are similar, the application of those elements differs between 
copyrights and trademarks. 
There is another important variation between the application of 
contributory infringement for copyrights and for trademarks. In Hard 
Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., the Seventh 
Circuit explained that, in Sony, “[t]he Supreme Court tells us that 
secondary liability for trademark infringement should . . . be more 
narrowly drawn than secondary liability for copyright infringement.”272 
In Sony, the Supreme Court recognized that the test set forth in Inwood 
Labs for trademarks was much stricter than that for copyrights because 
that test requires that the defendants either “intentionally induced” the 
infringers to infringe or “supply its products to identified individuals 
known by it to be engaging in continuing infringement . . . .”273 Neither 
of these elements were present in Sony.274 In addition, neither the 
Seventh Circuit case nor Sony actually involved the Internet. Therefore, a 
logical conclusion draws the standard for contributory trademark liability 
in the Internet context more narrowly than the standard for contributory 
copyright liability in the Internet context. 
2. Contributory Trademark Liability for Initial Interest Confusion in 
the Internet Context 
The new “ordinary prudent Internet consumer” standard for 
confusion would also affect the application of contributory liability for 
initial interest confusion in the Internet context. If initial interest 
confusion in the Internet context requires that the infringing 
advertisement display the plaintiff’s trademark, the application of the 
knowledge and intent tests must change. There are two important effects 
as a result. First, the changes to the requisite knowledge and intent 
requirements would satisfy the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Hard 
Rock—the test for contributory trademark liability in the Internet context 
would be more narrowly drawn that the test for copyright 
infringement.275 Second, the variation would operate to narrow the field 
of contributory infringers yet still balance the interests of Internet search 
engines, consumers, and intellectual property holders. 
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a) The Knowledge Test 
If the “new ordinary prudent Internet consumer” is confused only 
when the defendant actually displays the mark in the competing 
advertisement, the degree of knowledge required to establish 
contributory liability under the knowledge test changes in response. A 
plaintiff would now have to establish that the reasonable Internet search 
engine had reason to know that “it was actively participating in an 
operation which constituted . . . trademark infringement,” or that the 
advertisements the Internet service provider supported were infringing.276 
Therefore, the plaintiff would need to show that the Internet search 
engine knew or had reason to know that the advertisements actually 
displayed the plaintiff’s trademarks. This is a much narrower 
requirement than the copyright standard currently endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in Sony and MGM Studios.277 In those cases, the Court 
only required knowledge of specific instances of infringement, not 
specific knowledge of the content that was infringed.278 In contrast, 
requiring specific knowledge of the content of the advertisements is no 
different from the law’s treatment of ordinary brick-and-mortar 
commerce.279 A sign that uses another’s trademark to confuse consumers 
does not incur different legal consequences apart from a computer 
advertisement intending the same result.280 Courts adopting this standard 
would not need to carve exceptions or twist rigid legal standards to 
conform to ever-changing computing and advertising technologies. Thus, 
while the basic Internet standard would remain unchanged, the 
knowledge test would draw more narrowly in the trademark context than 
in the copyright context. 
Under a new standard, plaintiffs would face the challenge of 
establishing that an Internet search engine “knew or had reason to know” 
that the direct infringer’s advertisements used the plaintiff’s 
trademarks.281 However, in Google’s case, it may even be possible for 
plaintiffs to establish actual knowledge of specific instances of direct 
infringement akin to the Ninth Circuit’s requirement in Napster.282 For 
example, a plaintiff would have to demonstrate that Google had 
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knowledge of a direct infringer using the plaintiff’s trademark on the 
advertisements that Google facilitated. A court may find that Google had 
reason to know of the contents of the advertisements, because parties are 
generally responsible for trademark infringement on their own 
websites.283 Furthermore, under Google’s advertising program, Google 
reviews the contents of advertisements “using a combination of human 
and automated processes.”284 Google also helps clients determine the 
content of the advertisements that Google supports.285 Under such 
circumstances, Google could be liable for actual knowledge of infringing 
content in advertisements. However, determining liability through the 
knowledge inquiry would remain a very fact-sensitive inquiry. 
b) The Inducement Test 
The “new ordinary prudent Internet consumer” standard would also 
affect the level of intent required to establish contributory liability under 
the inducement test. Plaintiffs would be required to show that the Internet 
search engine encouraged the unauthorized use of trademarks in 
competing advertisements. The imposition of such a requirement would 
surely satisfy the MGM Studios standard for intent, since plaintiffs would 
essentially be demonstrating “clear expression or other affirmative steps . 
. . to foster infringement.”286 Yet nothing in the Google AdWords cases 
demonstrates egregious behavior comparable to that by the defendants in 
MGM Studios. Merely encouraging someone to advertise with Google 
would not be enough evidence to establish that Google encouraged its 
sponsors to use another’s trademarks without consent. However, courts 
could consider the “content assistance” which Google provides to its 
advertising clients,287 to be “purposeful, culpable expression and 
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conduct.”288 Again, determining intent to induce infringement would 
remain a very fact-sensitive inquiry. 
c) Balancing the Interests of Internet Search Engines and 
Intellectual Property Holders 
Requiring a heightened, but specific requirement of knowledge and 
intent would properly balance the interests of Internet search engines, 
consumers, and intellectual property holders. Internet search engines 
would still be able to profit from advertising sales without fear of 
liability because they would have a clear guideline to follow: do not 
support advertisers who use competitor’s trademarks as their own. 
Internet search engines would not necessarily bear a burden of changing 
any current advertising scheme or coding techniques; rather, they need 
only alter the content of the advertisements that the search engines 
support. Consumers would still be able to enter a trademark as a search 
term and benefit from the list of multiple sources and prices of similar 
goods. The standard would work to lessen consumers’ confusion while 
still promoting variety, knowledge, and choice. Although intellectual 
property holders may be discouraged because of the specificity required 
to establish contributory liability, establishing the requisite knowledge 
for contributory liability may not be impossible. Intellectual property 
holders would still be capable of curbing wide-spread infringement by 
suing Internet search engines. However, the need for lawsuits would 
decline if Internet search engines worked with advertisers to reduce the 
instances of infringement, as Google has done.289 By utilizing the new 
“ordinary prudent Internet consumer” standard, courts would be able to 
balance the interests of Internet search engines and intellectual property 
holders. 
The new “ordinary prudent Internet consumer” standard for initial 
interest confusion would generate two important effects on the 
application of contributory trademark liability. First, both the knowledge 
and intent legal tests would be more narrowly drawn and stricter in 
application than contributory copyright liability, as required by the 
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of a Supreme Court decision. Second, 
these changes to the direct application of the elements of contributory 
trademark liability would effectively balance the interests of Internet 
search engines, consumers, and intellectual property holders. Thus, the 
consequence of a new standard for initial interest confusion in the 
Internet context respects the differences between copyright and 
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trademark law and promotes the importance of balancing the interests of 
all parties affected by these decisions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has yet to address the problems presented by 
the “Average Joe” scenario. However, this comment suggests that by 
looking to the common goal of trademark and copyright law and 
addressing the way courts have applied the law to further this goal, many 
questions raised by the “Average Joe” scenario may answer themselves. 
Though copyright protection under the Copyright Act and trademark 
protection under the Lanham Act are not equivalent, both share a primary 
goal of balancing interests. When applying these laws, courts must 
balance the interests of the consumers, competitors, and intellectual 
property holders. The new “ordinary prudent Internet consumer” 
standard would alter the application of both initial interest confusion and 
contributory liability doctrine, yet the result would still balance the 
interests of the parties affected by the decision. Whatever future fate the 
Supreme Court or Congress dictates for initial interest confusion and 
contributory liability in the Internet context, the result should balance the 
interests of consumers, competitors, contributors and intellectual 
property holders. 
 
